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An Unbalanced Act: A Criticism of How the
Court of Arbitration for Sport Issues Unjustly
Harsh Sanctions by Attempting to Regulate
Doping in Sport
MELISSA HEWITT*
ABSTRACT
To participate in international competitions, countries must submit
to the doping rules set forth in the World Anti-Doping Code (the Code), a
document brought into being by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).
Under the Agency's Code, athletes are required to commit to mandatory
binding arbitration in the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which
gives them few chances for review of unjustly harsh sanctions. The CAS
needs to re-examine its method of appealing doping cases because
WADA's current strict liability scheme, coupled with the CAS's
transnational jurisdiction, continually violates the rights of
international athletes.
INTRODUCTION
After training as a gymnast since she was four-years-old, sixteen-
year-old Romanian athlete Andreea Rdducan finally found herself on
the world's stage when she was chosen to represent her country at the
2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia.' Before competing in the
Women's Individual All-Around Event, R6ducan complained to her team
doctor of having cold symptoms, for which the doctor administered a
standard cold and flu medication.2 R5ducan went on to win the Women's
Individual All-Around competition. After the event, she submitted to a
* Managing Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 22; JD 2015,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; BA 2012, Cornell University. The author would
like to thank the editors and reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments and
suggestions that contributed to improving the final version of this article.
1. Raducan v. IOC, CAS ad hoc Division OG 00/011, at 1, Award of 28 Sept. 2000 (Ct.
Arb. for Sport 2000), http://www.5rb.comlcase/raducan-v-iocl.
2. See id. at 2.
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drug test that revealed trace amounts of pseudoephedrine, a banned
substance found in the cold medicine she had taken earlier. 3 Based on
the results of the drug test, Olympic officials disqualified R~ducan from
the event and stripped the young gymnast of her gold medal. 4 After
reviewing the case, a panel from the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS) acknowledged that the small amount of pseudoephedrine could
not have enhanced Riducan's performance, but it nonetheless penalized
her for her accidental ingestion of the substance. 5
Since R4ducan, there have been scores of other athletes who have
either been stripped of their medals or suspended for the accidental
ingestion of banned substances. Take U.S. Swimming superstar Jessica
Hardy, for example. In 2008, Hardy, a world record holder in the
Women's 100-meter Breaststroke, tested positive for clenbuterol, a
banned anabolic agent.6 Though she had taken numerous steps to
confirm that the supplement was safe for consumption, she was severely
punished for her accidental ingestion of a banned substance. 7 Before
consuming the product, Hardy meticulously researched the supplement:
she had personal conversations with the manufacturers of the
supplement who assured her that it was pure; she obtained the
supplement directly from the manufacturer instead of through a third
party; and she consulted with her swimming coaching staff, including
the team's nutritionist, who again assured her that the product was fit
for consumption.8 Despite her efforts to remain drug-free, Hardy tested
positive for clenbuterol four weeks before the 2008 Olympic Games in
Beijing. 9 Though she had been taking the supplements for eight months
3. See id.
4. See Richard Sandomir, Sydney 2000. Gymnastics; Despite Losing Appeal,
Romanian Says Her Heart Is at Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/29/sports/sydney-2000-gymnastics-despite-losing-appeal-
romanian-says-her-heart-is-at-peace.html.
5. See Ryan Connolly, Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: The Need to Ensure
Fair Athletic Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs. the Protection of
Rights of Accused Athletes, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161, 181 (2006).
6. See Nathaniel Vinton, Swimmer Jessica Hardy Claims Doping Innocence - But
Tests Say Otherwise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 26, 2008, 11:22 PM), available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/more-sports/swimmer-jessica-hardyclaims-doping-
innocence-tests-article-1.353320; Anabolic agents stimulate muscle growth and can
contribute to an increase in lean mass and general gain usually achieved through high-
intensity exercise. This creates the potential for an athlete to gain unfair advantage. See
Fred Hartgens & Harm Kuipers, Effects of Androgenic-Anabolic Steroids in Athletes, 34
SPORTS MED. 513, 535-43 (2004) (discussing the effects of anabolic agents on athletes).
7. See World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, at 3, Award of 21 May
2010 (Ct. Arb. for Sport 2010), https://www.wada-ama.orgen/resources/legal/cas-wada-v-
hardy-usada.
8. Id. 72.
9. Id. 6.
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without failing a drug test, lab technicians alleged that her nutritional
supplements contained the banned substance. Hardy was forced to
withdraw from the 2008 Olympic Games, and instead of defending her
title as world-record holder, she found herself defending not only her
reputation against allegations of cheating, but also her career against a
two-year suspension from swimming competitions. 10 These and other
harsh rulings were handed down at the direction of the World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA), the drug-free sport enforcer of the
international sporting world.
Part I of this paper will provide information on the origin of the
World Anti-Doping Agency and the World Anti-Doping Code, and
examine how the Code functions in the international sports realm. Part
II will explain the origin and structure of the Court of Arbitration for
Sport and briefly discuss the scope of its power and how this power
affects athletes who compete at the international level. Part III will
explore the benefits and costs of delegating international sports disputes
to the CAS. Part III will also describe the relationship formed between
nation-states and a transnational body and what this relationship
teaches us about globalization. Part IV suggests a reform to WADA's
strict liability model that will decrease the number of violations against
innocent athletes. In Part V, this paper concludes that for the CAS's
transnational jurisprudence to be more effective, there needs to be a
mechanism put in place that will protect athletes against being unjustly
sanctioned.
I. THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
The World Anti-Doping Agency was formed in response to a
dramatic increase in the number of doping scandals that shook the
international sports world at the Tour de France in the summer of
1998.11 To help combat the increasing popularity of doping in
competitions, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) hosted the
World Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland, which
10. See id. 7-15. The CAS eventually reduced Hardy's suspension to one year, even
though WADA appealed this decision and sought a two-year suspension for the swimmer.
11. A Brief History of Anti-Doping, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (2015),
https://www.wada-amaorg/en/who-we-are/a-brief-history-of-anti-doping (last visited Mar.
28, 2015). Officials found large quantities of performance enhancing drugs in a car
belonging to one of the French cycling teams. A follow up investigation led to the opening
of a separate case into the Dutch cycling team, and the subsequent searching of many
teams during the race. The investigation revealed systematic doping, and suspicion was
raised that there may have been a widespread network of doping involving many teams of
the Tour de France.
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produced the Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport.12 The
Declaration "provided for the creation of an independent international
anti-doping agency," and WADA was subsequently established upon
this premise with the goal to "promote and coordinate the fight against
doping in sport internationally." 13 A second World Conference on Doping
in Sport was held in March 2003 where approximately 1,200 delegates
representing eighty governments, the IOC, all International
Federations for Olympic Sports, athletes, and others came together to
review and adopt the World Anti-Doping Code as the basis for the fight
against doping in sport.1 4 The document was meant to promote a
harmonized set of anti-doping rules in the international sporting
world. 15 According to WADA, "the Code is the core document that
provides the framework for harmonized anti-doping policies, rules and
regulations within sport organizations and among public authorities."1 6
Before the Code, many organizations had differences in their lists of
banned substances, rules, procedures, and penalties; the
implementation of the Code provided a more uniform way of regulating
doping prevention.17
Because the Code was created to ensure effective anti-doping
programs, the drafters adopted a strict liability framework that
guaranteed suspensions, even for innocent athletes like Rdducan and
Hardy who never sought to gain a competitive edge.18 To date, there
have been three versions of the Code, each one outlining an argument in
favor of strict liability.19 Most notably, the 2003 Code stated, "[i]t is true
12. Id.
13. Who We Are, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (2015), https://www.wada-ama.org/en/
who-we-are (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
14. Meredith Lambert, The Competing Justices of Clean Sport: Strengthening the
Integrity of International Athletics While Affording A Fair Process for the Individual
Athlete Under the World Anti-Doping Program, 23 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 409, 415
(2009).
15. See id. at 414.
16. Id. at 414 n.56.
17. See generally Jessica K. Foschi, A Constant Battle: The Evolving Challenges in the
International Fight Against Doping in Sport, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 459-61
(2006) (explaining the anti-doping systems that existed prior to the WADA regime).
18. See Karen Crouse, For Swimmer, Ban Ends, but Burden Could Last, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2010, SP1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/sports/08hardy.html
(describing Hardy's positive test for Clenbuterol and her struggle to return to
competition).
19. World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code 2003, at art. 2.1 (2003),
available at https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/fileswada _code_2003 en.pdf
[hereinafter WADA Code 2003]; World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code 2009,
at art. 2.1 (2009), available at https:/Hwada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.comresources/files/
wadaanti-doping-code_2009_en_0.pdf [hereinafter WADA Code 2009]; World Anti-Doping
Agency, World Anti-Doping Code 2015, at art. 2.1 (2015), available at https:!!wada-main-
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that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be unfair in an
individual case, such as . . . where the [althlete may have taken
medication as the result of mislabeling or faulty advice for which he or
she is not responsible ...."20 Though the drafters acknowledged that
the current framework facilitates unfairness, they justify their position
by inferring that some amount of unfairness is inevitable. 21
There are, of course, many good arguments in favor of this strict
liability framework. For example, in the 2015 Code, the drafters wrote
that sanctions would be even more inequitable than they currently are if
"[a]thletes from the same country who test positive for the same
Prohibited Substance under similar circumstances should receive
different sanctions only because they participate in different sports."22
And regarding the inadvertent ingestion of banned substances, one CAS
panel has said that
[tloo literal an application of the principle 'Nulla poena
sine culpa' could have damaging consequences on the
effectiveness of anti-doping measures. Indeed, if, for
each case, the sports federations had to prove the
intentional nature of the act (desire to dope to improve
one's performance) in order to be able to give it the force
of an offence, the fight against doping would become
practically impossible. 23
While WADA's justification in the first instance is understandable,
it fails to take into account that all sports are not created equal. A
suspension in one sport might be career ending, while a suspension in
another sport might be seen as a mere slap on the wrist.24 Regarding
the second justification offered by the CAS panel and the inadvertent
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/wada-redline-2015-wadc-to-2009-wadc-en.pdf
[hereinafter WADA Code 2015] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
20. WADA Code 2003, supra note 19, at comment to art. 2.1.1 (this language has been
removed from the most recently published 2015 Code, but WADA still maintains that
athletes will continue to be charged with an anti-doping violation without regard to their
fault).
21. See id.
22. WADA Code 2015, supra note 19, at comment to art. 10.
23. C. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), TAS 95/141,
Sentence du 22 avril 1996, 1, 5 (Ct. Arb. for Sport 1996), available at http://jurisprudence.
tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/141.pdf.
24. For example, compare gymnastics, which is age sensitive, to equestrian, which had
the oldest competitor in the London 2012 Olympics at 71 years old. London 2012's Oldest
Competitor, Hiroshi Hoketsu, Takes The Reins, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 2, 2012, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/aug/02/london-2012-oldest-hiroshi-hoketsu.
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ingestion of a banned substance, some argue that justice would be better
served if an athlete could be exonerated by proving: "1) that he or she
did not intend to ingest the banned substance, and 2) that the ingestion
of the substance had no performance-enhancing effect." 25
Whatever opinions people have about the fairness of the Code, the
fact still remains that in order to compete in the Olympics, countries
must submit to the rules of the Code and therefore subject their athletes
to the rules of the Code.26 The Code instructs that in the event of a
dispute regarding the harshness of a sanction under WADA's strict
liability scheme, all cases must be brought before the CAS, which has
exclusive jurisdiction over doping appeals involving international-level
athletes or international events. 27 In addition to the Olympics, other
major international sports organizations, like the F6d6ration
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), have made the CAS the
exclusive arbitral body for disputes arising during the course of
competition. 28 The Code is also enforced by the vast majority of sporting
federations and countries around the globe.29
II. THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT AND ITS
ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SPORTS DOPING DISPUTES
A. Origins
The increasing number of international sports disputes beginning in
the early 1980s highlighted the need for an independent authority
specializing in producing "quick, inexpensive, and binding" decisions on
sports-related matters.30 More specifically, the international sports
25. Connolly, supra note 5, 182 n.80. Connolly acknowledges, however, that this raises
"issues of judicial efficiency and the scientific difficulty of establishing efficacy" because
"[a]ctual performance enhancement is nearly impossible to conclusively prove or disprove."
26. See The Code, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/what-
we-do/the-code (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
27. WADA Code 2003, supra note 19, at art. 13.3.
28. In addition to doping disputes, the CAS handles cases regarding employment
contracts, field of play decisions, and another kind of dispute arising out of an
international sports competition. See Types of Disputes Submitted to the CAS, WORLD
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
29. Code Signatories, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/
what-we-do/the-code/code-signatories#GovernmentFundedOrganizations (last visited Mar.
28, 2015); National Anti-Doping Organizations (NADO), WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY,
https://www.wada-ama.org/en/who-we-are/anti-doping-community/national-anti-doping-
organizations-nado (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
30. IAN S. BLACKsHAw, SPORT, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 151 (Robert C.R.
Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds., 2009).
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realm needed a body to 'deal with crises of legitimacy in the sports
world' and to become the supreme forum for international sport."31
In response to the growing number of disputes, then-IOC President
H.E. Juan Antonio Samaranch had the idea of creating a sports-specific
jurisdiction whose sole responsibility would be to resolve disputes
related to sports and to pronounce binding decisions on these matters. 32
In 1982, IOC member H.E. Judge Keba Mbaye, who was then a judge at
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), led a group of IOC members
who were "tasked with drafting a document that would quickly become
the 'Court of Arbitration for Sport,' and the idea of creating an arbitral
jurisdiction dedicated to resolving disputes related to sport had thus
firmly been launched."33
B. Structure and Governance
The International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) acts as the
supreme organ of the CAS, and it exists mainly to "safeguard the
independence of the CAS and the rights of the parties appearing before
it." 34 The ICAS is made up of twenty members, all of whom must "be
high-level jurists well-acquainted with the issues of arbitration and
sports law."35 All the members are required to sign a declaration in
which they undertake "to exercise their function personally, with total
objectivity and independence."36 Section S6 of the CAS Code gives ICAS
the power to appoint CAS arbitrators, amend the CAS Code, and elect
the presidents of the Ordinary and Appeals Divisions of the CAS. 37 In
essence, the ICAS has overwhelming influence over the management,
administration, and regulation of the CAS.38
31. Rachelle Downie, Improving the Performance of Sport's Ultimate Umpire:
Reforming the Governance of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 MELB. J. INV'L L. 315,
334 (2011) (quoting Richard H McLaren, Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration for
Sport: A Look in the Rear-View Mirror, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 305, 306 (2010)); Michael
Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration
for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1206 (2005).
32. See Downie, supra note 31, at 321.
33. Matthieu Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS), in DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS 1986-1998, at XXIII (Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998).
34. BLACKSHAW, supra note 30, at 153.
35. REEB, supra note 33, at XXVIII.
36. Ct. Arb. for Sport, Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2013 Edition, S5 (Jan. 3,
2013), httpJ/www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user-upload/Code2O201320corrections20 finales20_en_.pdf
37. See id. at S6 for a complete list of functions of the ICAS.
38. Downie, supra note 31, at 318-19.
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The CAS maintains a minimum of 150 members through which the
body carries out its arbitral duties. 39 In building the list of arbitrators,
the ICAS must choose the candidates as follows:
* four members are appointed by the International
Sports Federations (IFs), viz. three by the
Association of Summer Olympic IFs (ASOIF) and
one by the Association of Winter Olympic IFs
(AIOWF), chosen from within or outside their
membership;
* four members are appointed by the Association
of the National Olympic Committees (ANOC),
chosen from within or outside its membership;
* four members are appointed by the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), chosen from within or
outside its membership;
* four members are appointed by the twelve
members of ICAS listed above, after appropriate
consultation with a view to safeguarding the
interests of the athletes; and
* four members are appointed by the sixteen
members of ICAS listed above, chosen from
among personalities independent of the bodies
designating the other members of the ICAS. 40
There are currently 330 CAS arbitrators, who represent the major
geographical regions: Africa, North America, Central America and the
Caribbean, South America, Asia, Europe, and Oceania.41
C. The Scope of the CAS's Power
Headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, and based on Swiss law,
the CAS is a self-regulating body governed by its own rules.42 Because
39. Code of Sports-Related Arbitration 2013 Edition, supra note 36, at S13.
40. Id. at S4.
41. Ct. Arb. for Sport, List of Arbitrators (General List), http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/arbitrationllist-of-arbitrators-general-list.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
42. See JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 40-41(2d ed. 2004).
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an overwhelming majority of sports bodies have delegated disputes to
the CAS, the power of this body continues to grow, and it has become a
major private legal entity with an "ever-increasing role in the
development of this sports-specific jurisprudence."4 3 To protect its
privately-produced public laws, the CAS declared that its arbitral
awards are final and binding, subject only to judicial review by the
Swiss Federal Court.44 Domestic courts lack jurisdiction to challenge
CAS awards because the "CAS was intended to usurp the role of
domestic courts in the resolution of sport disputes . ... "45
The arbitral awards of the CAS are said to be creating a "lex
sportiva, that is, a set of guiding principles and rules in international
sports law," which plays a major role in making the CAS more
powerful.46 The increase in the CAS's power can be attributed to several
other factors: it has been designated as the exclusive arbitral body for
the World Anti-Doping Agency, the Olympic Games, and for other
international sports federations. 47
III. ANALYZING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELEGATING TO THE CAS
While this paper is a criticism of the CAS's seemingly unfettered
power, it must first be acknowledged that though there are costs
associated with delegation to the CAS, there are also some benefits to
having an independent arbitral body that specializes in dealing with
sports-related disputes.
A. Benefits of Delegation
First, in the absence of an independent sports tribunal, those
seeking to resolve disputes would be forced to look to domestic courts,
which would either ignore the problems or handle them poorly.48
43. SIMON GARDINER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 45 (Routledge 4th ed. 2012) (1998).
44. See General Information, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/enlgeneral-
informationlfrequently-asked-questions.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
45. Marcus F. Mazzucco & Hilary A. Findlay, Re-Thinking the Legal Regulation of the
Olympic Regime: Envisioning a Broader Role for the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 15-16
(Paper presented at the Tenth International Symposium for Olympic Research, Canada,
Oct. 29, 2010).
46. Eric T. Gilson, Exploring the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 503,
504 (2006).
47. See Olympic Charter, INT'L OLYMPIC COMM. (IOC), 105 (Sept. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.olympic.orgDocuments/olympic charter-en.pdf; JUA Statutes, INTERNATIONAL
JUDO FEDERATION, art. 27 (2003), available at http://www.intjudo.eu/cikk76.
48. See Anthony T. Polvino, Arbitration As Preventative Medicine for Olympic
Ailments: The International Olympic Committee's Court of Arbitration for Sport and the
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Moreover, if domestic courts adjudicated sports disputes, athletes and
organizations would face conflicting laws across jurisdictions. 49 There is
also the likelihood of "home-field advantage" for athletes litigating in
their home countries, and handing these disputes over to the CAS
minimizes the potential for bias. 50
Second, the fiercest proponents of delegation to the CAS believe that
delegation legitimizes, not diminishes, state sovereignty. 51 Several
authors point out that the loss of sovereignty is "[tjhe most discussed
perceived cost of international delegation," but that the fear of the loss
of state sovereignty is unwarranted. 52 Oona Hathaway vehemently
disputes what she thinks is a significantly flawed belief, urging us to
consider that delegation requires a state actor's consent, and this
consent is an exercise of state power. Moreover, she asserts that states
are never bound to these acts of delegation because the power to revoke
the independent body's decision always remains in the state's hands.
She writes,
Even more important than the initial consent to
international delegations is the conditional nature of
nearly all such delegations. In most international
delegations, states retain the power to revoke authority
after it has been granted. As a consequence, states
remain free from external control in any meaningful
sense, for they are controlled by the decisions of the
international body only so long as they agree to be. Once
their agreement ceases, the control over them ceases as
well.5 3
Future for the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 347,
358(1994).
49. See Ian Blackshaw, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An International Forum for
Settling Disputes Effectively Within the Family of Sport, 2 ENT. L. 61, 61-62 (2003).
50. An example of this can be seen in cases before the establishment of the CAS,
wherein the IOC was the final arbitrator for disputes even when it was itself a party to
the dispute. See History of the CAS, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT. http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html, (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
51. See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447 (2007).
52. Abbas Ravjani, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: A Subtle Form of International
Delegation, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 241, 258 (2009).
53. Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 122 (2008).
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For Hathaway, the act of delegation is "sovereign consent" that
demonstrates a state's sovereign ability, instead of undermining it.54
Hathaway is not the only proponent of CAS delegation who believes
this to be true. Abbas Ravjani agrees that while the loss of state
sovereignty is a legitimate concern in some areas, delegation to the CAS
is not one of those areas. 55 Ravjani bolsters her point by arguing that
delegation to the CAS is the optimal solution to the international doping
problem because the CAS is efficient and effective. 56 This reasoning is
based on the fact that "states have shown a willingness to legitimate the
court as is shown by the adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code, which
designates the CAS as the final appellate authority for all doping
disputes arising from international competition."57 For Ravjani, the act
of delegation alone, by so many nations and federations, legitimizes the
CAS as an effective arbitral body.58
Third, the CAS eliminates the "protracted litigious disputes" that
are characteristic of domestic courts.5 9 As Ravjani explains, "states
understand that sometimes a specialized body is in a better position to
act on a particular international issue and that allowing that body to act
on its behalf will produce more efficient outcomes than if they tried to
act alone."60 It is unlikely that domestic courts would be as skilled and
efficient as an independent tribunal in resolving sports disputes.
Delegation to a specialized body seems like the obvious thing to do since
delegation on specific issues provides for efficient outcomes that may not
be achievable independently. 61 Equally important, the CAS has no
personal interest in the outcome of disputes, and the absence of
personal interest is essential because it gives all parties the benefit of
having a neutral arbitrator that will administer fair results.
Finally, proponents of CAS delegation hold that, to be effective, the
institution needs to be independent and guarded against judicial
54. Id.
55. Ravjani, supra note 52.
56. Id. at 272-73.
57. Id.
58. Ravjani, supra note 52, at 258 (referring to Eric Posner and John Yoo who describe
few situations in which delegation to tribunals may be effective); see generally Eric A.
Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (2005) (exploring the role of international dispute resolution in international
politics and explaining how international tribunals gain legitimacy).
59. Darren Kane, Twenty Years on: An Evaluation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport,
4 MELB. J. INT'L L. 611, 612 (2003).
60. Ravjani, supra note 52, at 259 (citing Darren G. Hawkin et. al, Delegation Under
Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION
AND AGENCY IN INT'L ORGS. 3, 13 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
61. See id.
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intervention. 62 Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter examined
the characteristics of an effective international court and have argued
that a tribunal's effectiveness is correlated with its independence. 63 In
other words, the CAS will be effective only if states allow it to act freely
and comply with its judgments. 64 Oona Hathaway agrees with Helfer
and Slaughter's view that "effective international tribunals are
independent: they are composed of senior, respected jurists with
substantial terms; they have an independent fact-finding capacity; their
decisions are binding as international law; they make decisions on the
basis of 'principle rather than power'; and they engage in high-quality
legal reasoning."65 For the proponents of delegation, the CAS should be
hailed as the "world court of sport" because of its specialization and
efficiency. 66
B. Costs of Delegation
The CAS, as a private transnational lawmaker, receives its power
both from international sporting organizations and national
governments, but this does not necessarily mean that its rules are
legitimate or beyond criticism. While it is important to acknowledge the
benefits of delegation to the CAS, it is equally important to point out
that it can also impose various costs to states, specifically to the athletes
that belong to those states.
To begin, delegating sports disputes to the CAS seems like a good
idea at first, but it is only a good idea if the private body a state has
authorized to act on a state's behalf is acting fairly. What happens when
the actions of the CAS erode core national values? What can states do to
spare their athletes from unjustly harsh punishment? Under the CAS's
current scheme-nothing. There are 193 governments that have
delegated the CAS to adjudicate sports disputes on their behalf, which
means that the power of lex sportiva is currently in the hands of 330
62. See generally RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1994) (criticizing the power of worldwide
conglomerates and arguing that these powers have created a global system that is largely
ungoverned and unregulated by nation-states, resulting in negative implications for most
of the world's population).
63. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 282-87 (1997).
64. See id.
65. Posner & Yoo, supra note 58, at 5-6 (quoting Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 63, at
314).
66. Antoine Duval, Lex Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law, 19 EUR. L.J.
822, 830 (2013).
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individuals. 67 The interests of tens of thousands of athletes are at stake,
yet power is centralized in the hands of the few. When it comes to
fairness, there is a great cost to athletes subject to the CAS's
jurisdiction because the CAS will inevitably "disagree with, rule
against, or render interpretations that run counter to what [national
governments] might have wanted, and what the democratic majority
might prefer."68 The CAS has a monopoly over the international sports
arena, and it is subject to the minimalist of review standards. 69 This is
made clear in the Federal Code on Private International Law:
1. The award is final from its notification.
2. The award may only be annulled:
a. If a sole arbitrator was designated
irregularly or the arbitral tribunal was
constituted irregularly;
b. If the arbitral tribunal erroneously held
that it had or did not have jurisdiction;
c. If the arbitral tribunal ruled on matters
beyond the claims submitted to it or if it
failed to rule on one of the claims;
d. If the equality of the parties or their
right to be heard in adversarial
proceeding was not respected;
e. If the award is incompatible with Swiss
public policy.70
What happens when the "justice" the CAS administers is unfair? There
is no provision in the CAS's Code that provides recourse for a
disproportionately harsh award.
Second, some authors have tried to dispel arguments that
globalization diminishes state sovereignty and have contended that the
CAS functions effectively because it is independent from domestic
67. List of Arbitrators (General List), COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitration/list-of-arbitrators-general-list.html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2015).
68. Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding us. Other-Binding
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 39 (2008).
69. Duval, supra note 66, at 833.
70. SWITZERLAND'S FEDERAL CODE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW [CPIL] art. 190(2)
(Dec. 18, 1987).
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courts. 71 There are others, however, who have recognized that "[t]he
pooling of sovereignty and the delegation of state power to international
bodies inevitably have denationalizing effects . *."..72 Inherent in this
framework of independence is the lack of accountability. The CAS is in a
league all its own; it self-regulates by its own rules and through its own
internal political processes with no external agency to hold it
accountable.7 3 The absence of outside pressure invites private bodies
like the CAS to abuse their power.7 4 Nations have, in a sense, put their
athletes in the hands of a private society that is an isolated legal system
functioning under its own principles.7 5 The CAS will become truly
legitimate only when its functions and mechanisms can be scrutinized.7 6
Third, while consent to jurisdiction of the CAS is voluntary and
states can simply choose not to become a signatory to the World Anti-
Doping Code (which, as stated above, is a document that makes the CAS
the exclusive arbitrator of sports-related disputes arising out of
international competitions or involving international athletes), failing to
become a signatory means states would be unable to participate in the
Olympic Games, host the Olympic Games, or participate in any other
international sporting event that requires submission to the Code. 77
This has led many scholars to question the de facto nature of acceding to
jurisdiction.78 One author has observed,
The initial idea of the founders that the CAS would not
be imposed upon athletes or federations remains in
71. Hathaway, supra note 53, at 122; see also Matthew J. Mitten-& Hayden Opie,
"Sports Law" Implications for the Development of International, Comparative, and
National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269 (2010) (discussing the
influence that sports law has had on the development of global dispute resolution and
international laws).
72. Alfred C. Aman Jr., Globalization: Legal Aspects 5 (Aug. 28, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
73. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1010
(Michelle Everson trans., 2004).
74. See generally Alfred C. Aman Jr. & Peer C. Zumbansen, Transnational Law:
Norms, Actors And Processes (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing
the Foxconn case study and the problems that arise when large corporations engage in
private self-regulatory processes without outside accountability).
75. See Duval, supra note 66, at 827-28.
76. See id. at 834.
77. What Happens ifa Sports Organization or a Government Does Not Comply With the
Code?, WORLD ANTI DOPING AGENCY (2015), available at https://www.wada-ama.org/en/
questions-answers/world-anti-doping-code (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
78. See Stephen A. Kaufman, Note, Issues in International Sports Arbitration, 13 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 527, 527-30 (1995) (describing the process of delegation jurisdiction to the CAS
in order to compete in a competition).
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principle; however over time, since most international
sports competitions have chosen the CAS as its court of
choice, the decisions of the Olympics or World Cup
trickles down to the [International Federations],
[National Olympic Committees], [National Governing
Bodies], and ultimately to individual athletes.7 9
There is an obvious imbalance in the distribution of power between
the CAS and the countries that submit to its power. Although authors
like Oona Hathaway suggest that acceding to CAS jurisdiction is
optional and can be revoked at any time, the reality suggests that the
opposite is true. Hathaway herself has acknowledged that
[w]hen there are significant asymmetries in power
between the parties to an international delegation, the
weaker party's consent may reflect the disproportionate
influence of the stronger. The most familiar-and
extreme-instances of such asymmetric power are found
when consent to a delegation is coerced. Less obvious,
but more common today, are delegations generated
when states with unequal power enter agreements that
one or more of them simply cannot afford to refuse.8 0
When access to international sports competitions depends on
submitting to the jurisdiction of the CAS, is the decision to become a
signatory really a choice? It is almost impossible to remain outside the
CAS regime because the benefits forgone by not being subject to its
jurisprudence carry heavy consequences.8 1
C. What Does This Teach Us About Globalization?
Broadly stated, globalization can be defined as the "process of
denationalization of clusters of political, economic, and social
activities. '82 The delegation of power to the CAS is a product of this
process. Some have argued that "[t]o be sovereign, a state must be
independent, which means that the state cannot be put under a duty or
obligation by those external to it."83 While delegation to the CAS
79. Ravjani, supra note 52, at 250.
80. Hathaway, supra note 53, at 137.
81. See id. at 138.
82. Jost Delbriick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for
Domestic Law--A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993).
83. See Hathaway, supra note 53, at 121.
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produces quick resolution of doping cases, athletes are forced to live
with decisions made by individuals who are not their direct
representatives to whom they are not held accountable.8 4 In this way,
globalization creates an uneven distribution of power.8 5 As political
scientists have observed, there has been a relative fall of state power
since the CAS gained popularity. 86
By "relative fall," researchers mean "a partial 'retreat of the state'
from a(n) (imagined) position of almightiness in the international and
national political scene."87 The globalization of sports law has all but
rendered governments, international bodies, and athletes helpless
against the private organization that has begun to take over the
transnational legal space.
The relationship between national bodies and the CAS further
teaches us that globalization widens the gap between the smaller, less
powerful nation-state and the larger transnational institution. In our
case, it is not surprising that some athletes feel a growing sense of
helplessness as they fight against an external force over which neither
they nor their own governments have any control.88 For globalization to
work, there needs to be a constant flow of communication between the
state and the transnational actor.
When all is said and done, the CAS accomplishes what the founders
wanted it to achieve: it resolves international sports disputes in a quick
and efficient manner, but it also has the potential to greatly undermine
the powers of individual states.
84. See U.K. Jha, Democratic Deficits in a Globalizing World: Thy Way Out, 65 INDIAN
J. POL. SCI. 531, 531 (2004).
85. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 725 (2002) (stating that Globalization
inhibits the ability of nation-states to exercise proactive regulatory power on transnational
bodies).
86. Duval, supra note 66, at 824.
87. Id. (referencing S. GEORGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996)).
88. Jer6 Longman, Sprinter Leaves Humiliation Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/sports/olympics/sprinter-lashawn-merritt-
leaves-humiliation-behind.html.
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IV. PROPOSED REFORM: ALLOWING REASONABLE MISTAKE OF FACT AS A
DEFENSE TO THE STRICT LIABILITY SCHEME
A. Allowing Reasonable Mistake of Fact as a Defense to the Strict
Liability Scheme
While the use of strict liability seems to be an easy and cost-effective
way of handing out sanctions, this scheme fails to address the inherent
unfairness endured by athletes who inadvertently ingest banned
substances. We have seen the harshest drawback of this scheme: that it
punishes innocent athletes like Andreea R~ducan and Jessica Hardy.
The Code drafters themselves have previously admitted that a strict
liability test is likely to be unfair for some athletes.8 9 Despite this
realization, they have failed to mitigate the effects of this unfairness,
suggesting that an unfair application of the rules is the lesser of two
evils. 90 Since it may be impossible to completely eliminate unfairness
with a strict liability model, allowing athletes to call upon a reasonable
"mistake of fact" defense would make for a more equitable judicial
process.
The "mistake of fact" or "ignorance of fact" doctrine is largely built
upon Levett's Case, a criminal case decided in 1638.91 In this case, the
defendant, under the mistaken belief that there was a burglar in his
home, killed Frances, who was the friend of his servant.92 The court held
that this act was not manslaughter because the defendant committed
the act "ignorantly, without intention of hurt to the said Frances." 93
After this decision, courts began to adopt the doctrine that a "factual
mistake is a reasonable one that negates the culpable mental state
required for the commission of the offense."94
For inadvertent doping cases, the "mistake of fact" defense should
be allowed if an athlete believed in good faith that the substance they
were ingesting was not on the banned-substance list. This defense
should include a mistake of fact caused by reasonable reliance on
information provided by another person; a mistake of fact caused by the
act or default of another person; or a mistake of fact caused by an
accident or some other circumstance beyond the athlete's control, and
89. WADA Code 2003, supra note 19, at art. 2.1.
90. See id. at art. 10.5.
91. Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REv. 75,
79-80 (1908).
92. Id.
93. Rex v. Levett, (1638) 79 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B.).
94. Henderson v. State, No. A-3929, 1992 WL 12153172, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. May 6,
1992).
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the athlete took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to
avoid ingesting a banned substance. If, like Hardy, an athlete took
precautionary measures and did not know, and had no reason to suspect
that they were ingesting a banned substance, then they should not be
held liable.
Like any model, the one proposed has its limitations. Supporters of
the strict liability doctrine point to the difficulty of proving mens rea as
the explanation for the emergence of strict liability. With the proposed
model, the CAS would have to prove that the athlete ingested a banned
substance with the requisite culpable mental state. Subjective mental
states are often difficult to prove, and the CAS would have to rely on
circumstantial evidence. Strict liability supporters often cite increased
administrative costs associated with verifying a defendant's thoughts as
a reason to abandon the mens rea requirement. 95
However, this is only true when we expect an exceptionally large
number of cases to reach the court. 96 Because this is not the case, and
there are not an exceptionally large number of cases before the CAS, the
court can afford to employ a mens rea requirement. To date, the CAS
has published a total of 439 non-confidential cases since its first
arbitration procedure in 1986.97 There is no indication of the number of
confidential cases, but surely this is not an exceptionally large number
for a twenty-eight year time period. Whatever the case may be,
accidentally ingesting a banned substance would eliminate mens rea,
which exists to prevent disproportional punishment as well as
punishment of blameless conduct.
Allowing the reasonable mistake of fact defense would provide
greater fairness to athletes who unintentionally ingest banned
substances, while still adequately punishing those who had the culpable
mental state required for the commission of the offense. Besides being
stripped of their medals and being unable to compete, athletes face the
inevitable result of being labeled a cheater. As long as the WADA
continues to operate under a strict liability framework, athletes like
Rducan and Hardy will continue to endure disproportionately harsh
sanctions.
95. See Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 418
(2007).
96. See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
69 (1933) (explaining that criminalizing petty regulations places strain on the criminal
system).
97. Case Law Documents, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/
CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/Forms/All%20Decisions.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
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CONCLUSION
It cannot be disputed that athletes need to play by a certain set of
rules; this is the nature of international competition. That the CAS is
carrying out an essential function cannot be questioned, but for some
athletes, the advent of the CAS's strict liability scheme has been
unpleasant. The simple fact is that the CAS's private lawmaking takes
away a state's power to exercise authority over its own athletes. The
institution has unbridled autonomous rulemaking powers, it lacks
accountability, and provides hardly any recourse for athletes for whom
"justice" is unfair. The CAS owes its validity to the fact that it is
recognized and enabled by the state,98 but in delegating its powers, the
state must remember that it has a duty to protect the interests of its
citizens. 99
98. See generally Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 860 (2006)
(explaining that private law is part of a coherent legal system owing its validity and
legitimacy to the fact that it is conceived as a coherent whole and enacted or enabled by
the state).
99. See Andrew Linklater, The Evolving Spheres of International Justice, 75 INT'L AFF.
473, 478 (1999).
